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Sarbak: New York's Educational Finance Scheme

NEW YORK'S EDUCATIONAL FINANCE
SCHEME: SHOULD IT BE DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
"Today, education is perhaps the most importantfunction of state
and local governments... [and s]uch an opportunity, where the
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made
availableto all on equal terms. ,,
INTRODUCTION

Americans have long recognized the importance of having the
opportunity to receive a free and equal public education. 2 In
addition, it is well known that New York State is regarded as a

forerunner inproviding such an education. 3 One must question,
however, whether New York's educational finance scheme
should remain constitutional under the Education Article of the
1. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
2. See R. Stephen Browning & David C. Long, School Finance Reform
and the Courts after Rodriguez, in SCHOOL FINANCE IN TRANSITION, THE
COURTS AND EDUCATIONAL REFORD 82 (1974). The authors note that equal

educational opportunity has different meanings to different individuals. Some
view it as equality in teaching personnel and resources, while others see it as
achievement by student performance, and still others view equality in terms of
racial and economic composition. Id. Equality in education is an ever changing
and evolving concept within the legislative and judicial branches. The meaning
of equality has been addressed primarily through cases involving the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. The authors point out that
the following inequalities have been examined:
1. Equal services and facilities among racial groups (e.g., in school
plant, per-pupil expenditures, teacher experience);
2. Equal intangible factors among racial groups (e.g., morale,
prestige, expectations in the school);
3. Equal or balanced racial compositions of the school;
4. Equal consequences of the school for individuals from rich and
poor backgrounds;
5. Equal public resources to the schools regardless of the wealth or
poverty of the school district.
Id. at 82-83.
3. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 48, 439 N.E.2d 359,
369, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 653 (1982).
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State's Constitution, 4 and the Equal Protection Clause of the
State 5 and Federal Constitutions, 6 after an examination of the
recent trends in this area of law.
Over the years, significant attempts at reform have been made
with regard to the various school financing systems throughout
the nation. Both state and federal courts have examined the
constitutionality of an educational financing system wherein
7
funding is primarily accomplished through local property taxes.
Such funding systems are generally statewide, which permits
4. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § I. This provision states that "[t]he legislature
shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common
schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated." Id.
5. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. This provision provides that "[n]o person
shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision
thereof." Id.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 4. The Equal Protection Clause
provides: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall.., deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
7. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
-Shofstall v. Hollins, 515 P.2d 590 (Ariz. 1973); Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist.,
651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971),
cert. denied sub nom., Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Lujan v.
Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo. 1982); Horton v. Meskill,
486 A.2d 1099 (Conn. 1985); People ex rel. Jones v. Adams, 350 N.E.2d 767
(I11.
App. Ct. 1976); Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186
(Ky. 1989); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 458 A.2d 758 (Md.
1983); Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972), vacated, 212
N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Montana,
784 P.2d 412 (Mont. 1990); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990);
Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied sub nom., Dickey v.
Robinson, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27,
439 N.E.2d 359, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 390
N.E.2d 813 (Ohio 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Fair Sch. Fin.
Council of Okla. v. Oklahoma, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v. Oregon,
554 P.2d 139 (Or. 1976); Danson v. Casey, 382 A.2d 1238 (Pa. 1978), aft'd,
399 A.2d 360 (1979); Richland County v. Campbell, 364 S.E.2d 470 (S.C.
1988); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989);
Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Washington, 585 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1978); Pauley v.
Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1979); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568
(Wis. 1989); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310
(Wyo.), cert. denied sub nom., Hot Springs County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v.
Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
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educational resources to differ between school districts according

to the taxable wealth of an individual district. Much controversy
has been generated over this type of funding system because of
the extreme disparities between property-poor and property-rich
districts. 8 Over the past several years, twenty-four states have
evaluated whether such disparities render their state's financing
system unconstitutional. 9 Of these twenty-four states, fourteen
state supreme courts have found such financing schemes
constitutional; 10 only ten of the states' highest courts have found
them unconstitutional. 11
Although the majority of states have held their respective

financing schemes constitutional, 12 since 1989 there has been a
growing awareness of the inequities in school finance systems
that rely primarily on property taxes as a funding source. 13 This
8. See supra note 7.
9. See Tricia Bevelock, Public School Financing Reform: Renewed
Interest in the Courthouse, But Will the Statehouse Follow Suit?, 65 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 467, 467 (1991).
10. See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 373 n.5 (N.J. 1990); Bevelock,
supra note 9, at 467 n.1. The states upholding their financing schemes are:
Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Wisconsin. Id.
11. See Abbott, 575 A.2d at 373 n.6-7; Bevelock, supra note 7, at 467
n.1. The following states declared their educational financing schemes
unconstitutional: Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Kentucky, Montana, New
Jersey, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming. Id.
12. See supra note 10.
13. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211-12
(Ky. 1989) (striling down funding system by finding that the legislature failed
to provide an efficient system as mandated by the state education article and
declaring education a fundamental right); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No.1
v. State, 769 P.2d 684, 691 (Mont. 1989) (finding the school finance system
unconstitutional because disparities between wealthy and poor school districts
created inequities in educational opportunity); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359
(N.J. 1990) (holding funding system unconstitutional as applied to poorer
school districts since a "thorough and efficient" system was not provided);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989)
(holding that its funding system was unconstitutional under the education
provision of the Texas State Constitution due to the vast disparities existing
among school districts).
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Comment explores the history of the educational finance
movement and its effect on the New York system, as well as the
recent changes and trends in this area of law. This Comment
concludes that the New York Court of Appeals must recognize
the wide range of disparities existing in the state education
system today and re-examine the constitutionality of the current
system, as it serves to perpetuate such disparities. If New York is
to remain a national leader in education, changes must be made
within the current system.

HISTORY
A. Beginning The Battle Of Reform In State Court
The public school financing issue was first addressed by a
state's highest court in Serrano v. Priest.14 In Serrano, the
California Supreme Court considered whether its school funding
system, which depended primarily upon property taxes, was
constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 15 The California court held that the
14. 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). Subsequent to Serrano, litigation in the
school funding area began to emerge. Both state and federal courts examined
inequities among school districts. See supra notes 9-11; see also Rodriguez v.
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd,
411 U.S. 1 (1973); Milliken v. Green, 203 N.W.2d 457 (Mich. 1972),
vacated, 212 N.W.2d 711 (Mich. 1973); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.
Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971); Spano v. Board of Educ. of Lakeland Sch. Dist.
No. 1, 68 Misc. 2d 804, 328 N.Y.S.2d 229 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1972); Sweetwater County Planning Comm. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (Wyo.
1971). The New Jersey Supreme Court took a different approach than that
employed by the court in Serrano. The decision was not based on equal
protection grounds, but rather on the grounds of a "thorough and efficient"
system as mandated by the state education provision. See Robinson v. Cahill,
303 A.2d 273, 298 (N.J. 1973); see also infra notes 133-139 and
accompanying text.
15. Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1244. During the 1968-69 school year, the
California system was funded in the following manner: local property taxes,
55.7%; state aid, 35.5%; federal funds, 6.1%; miscellaneous sources, 2.7%.
Id. at 1246 n.2.
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"funding scheme invidiously [sic] discriminates against the poor
because it makes the quality of a child's education a function of
the wealth of his parents and neighbors." 16 In rendering this
decision, the court accepted the plaintiffs' contention that this
system of financing, which resulted in a wide range of
educational disparities, classified on the basis of wealth.1 7 The
court recognized that, although tax revenue is primarily a
"function of the rate at which the residents of a district are
willing to tax themselves," it is also logical that those districts
with a lower tax base are unable to levy taxes in a manner
18
comparable to the more affluent districts.
In addition to classifications based on wealth, the plaintiffs
asserted another claim, namely that education was a fundamental
right that could not be-conditioned on wealth. 19 In resolving this
issue, the court recognized the importance of education not only
on an individual level, but also on a societal level, 20 noting that
education is not only necessary for effective participation in a
democracy, but is also important in shaping values. 2 1 Since the
finance system classified on the basis of wealth and was directly
related to education, the court applied the strict scrutiny standard
of review. 22 The court concluded that since no compelling state
interest was served by a funding system which perpetuated
disparities in educational opportunity, the California system could
not withstand this level of review and was found
unconstitutional. 23
16. Id. at 1244.
17. Id. at 1250.

18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id. at 1255.
Id. at 1256.
Id. at 1258.

22. Id. at-1263.

23. Id. It should be noted that the Serrano court, in a footnote, made clear
that this decision was also based on state constitutional grounds. The court
found that the school funding system violated Article 1, §§ 11 and 21 of the
California Constitution. Id. at 1249 n. 11. Article 1, § 11 provides in pertinent

part: "All laws of a general nature shall have uniform application." CAL.
CONST. art 1, § 11. Article 1, § 21 provides: "No special privileges or
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Subsequent to Serrano, other courts also declared their public
school funding systems unconstitutional based on equal protection
grounds. For example, in Van Dusartz v. Hatfield,24 the United
States District Court for the District of Minnesota held that the
Minnesota funding system was unconstitutional under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 25 The plaintiffs
challenged the constitutionality of the "system of financing public
elementary and secondary education," alleging that "the number
of dollars per pupil spent in their school districts is a function of
the amount of taxable wealth per pupil located within the
"...,,26
boundaries of those districts .
Again, the court utilized a strict scrutiny standard, finding
education to be a fundamental interest and classification based on
"district wealth" to be suspect. 27 In its decision, the court relied
heavily on the "persuasive analysis" rendered by the Serrano
court which, according to the district court, had "correctly
inferred from relevant expressions of the United States Supreme
Court and from the nature of education itself that this interest is
28
truly fundamental in the constitutional sense."
The district court rejected the state's assertion that
"maintaining the strength of local government by preserving local
choice in school spending" was a compelling interest. 29 The
court stated that "[t]o promote such an erratic dispersal of
privilege and burden on a theory of local control of spending
would be quite impossible." 30 Furthermore, the court maintained
that "if the state chooses to emphasize local control, it remains
free to do so to whatever degree it wishes ... except that of
immunities shall ever be granted ...

nor shall any citizen or class of citizens,

be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be
granted to all citizens." CAL. CONST. art 1, § 21.
24. 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971).
25. Id. at 877.
26. Id. at 872. The court noted that "some districts have almost no taxable

wealth while others range up to and even above $30,000 per pupil." Id.
27. Id. at 874.
28. Id. at 875.
29. Id. at 876.
30. Id.
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distributing education according to wealth." 3 1 The court
concluded its opinion by holding that "a system of public school
financing which makes spending per pupil a function of the
school district's wealth violates the equal protection guarantee of
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. "32
In addition, in Robinson v. Cahill,3 3 a New Jersey superior
court also found a state funding system to be violative of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution. 34 The public school
system at issue was "funded primarily by local real property
taxes," which resulted in "wide disparities in education
expenditures" within the districts. 35 The court determined that
the system must be scrutinized under the strict scrutiny test,
noting that "'[e]ducation is one of the most important functions
of state governments, and educational opportunities, where the
state has undertaken to provide them, [are] a right that must be
made available to all on equal terms.'36
The court determined that no compelling state interest existed
that would justify the present system, stating that "[w]hile local
control is desirable, discriminations should not be tolerated if
they are not necessary for achieving the stated purpose."37 In
finding the system violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
court noted that the state could develop a finance system that

31. Id.
32. Id. at 877.
33. 287 A.2d 187 (N.J. 1972), nodified, 303 A.2d 273 (1973). On appeal,
the Supreme Court of New Jersey modified the lower court decision. While the
supreme court affirmed the lower court's decision with regard to the
unconstitutionality of the system, relying on the United States Supreme Court
decision in San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), it held
the funding system only to be violative of the New Jersey Constitution. See
Robinson, 303 A.2d at 279-82; see also infra notes 133-139 and accompanying
text.
34. Robinson, 287 A.2d at 214-15.

35. Id. at 189-91.
36. Id. at 214 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954)).
37. Id.
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"affords equal protection to all pupils without precluding local
38
control over public education."
B. How The Fourteenth Amendment Was EliminatedAs A Means
To Reform EducationalFunding
In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez,39 the United
States Supreme Court examined the educational adequacy of the
Texas public school funding system. 4 0 In rendering its decision,
the majority acknowledged that financial disparities existed
among the various school districts within the state. 4 1 The Court,
however, in a 5-4 decision, reversed the lower court, 42 holding
that disparities in Texas state school funding, as they existed
under the educational finance system, did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
43
States Constitution.
The challenge was made on behalf of Mexican-American
44
children who resided in districts with lower property tax bases.
45
The plaintiffs' contention was that the Texas funding system
denied them equal protection of the laws under the State and
Federal Constitutions and was violative of the Texas Education
Code. 46 The district court initially concluded that the large
disparities in school expenditures were attributable to the vast
differences in the amount of revenue collected through property
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id.
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
Id. at 4.
Id. at 54-55.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This section provides in

pertinent part that "[no] State [shall] ... deny to any person... the eqtal
protection of the laws." Id.
44. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 4-5.

45. In 1947, the Texas Legislature established the Texas Minimum
Foundation School Program. During the 1970-71 school year, this program
accounted for 48% of the state's education funds, whereas local taxation
generated 41.1%, and 10.9% was provided by federal aid. Id. at 9 n.21.
46. See Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280,
281 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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taxes. 47 The court determined that a funding system that actually
discriminated on the basis of wealth was suspect. 4 8 Since a
classification based on wealth and a fundamental interest were at
stake, the court determined that the rational basis test could not
be applied. 4 9 The court stated that "[b]ecause of the grave
significance of education both to the individual and to our
society, the defendants must demonstrate a compelling state
interest that is promoted by the current classifications created
50
under the financing scheme."

According to the court, the state's assertion of "granting
decisionmaking power to individual districts, and... permitting
local parents to determine how much they desire to spend on
their children's schooling," failed to rise to the level of a
compelling state interest which could justify the classifications
created by the funding system. 5 1 The court stated that "[n]ot only
are defendants unable to demonstrate [a] compelling state interest
for their classifications based upon wealth, they fail even to
establish a reasonable basis for these classifications. "52 As a
result, the court held that Texas' school funding system denied
children of poorer districts equal protection of the laws, and
therefore, violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
53
States Constitution.
47. Id. at 282.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 283; see also JOHN E. NOwYAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONsTrruTiONAL LAWv § 14.3, at 580 (4th ed. 1991). The rational basis test is
applied when a fundamental right is not at stake, and wherein the Court does
not find that special protection is required for a certain class of persons. Id.
This test provides: "the classification only has to have a rational relationship to
any legitimate government interest in order to comply with the equal protection
guarantee." Id.
50. Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. at 283.
51. Id.at 284.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 281. The court relied on the analysis in the earlier California
decision in Serrano, finding that the state itself was responsible for the
differences in wealth of the school districts. Id. at 281 n.1; see also Serrano v.
Priest, 487 P.2d 1241 (Cal. 1971). The district court also found that the
plaintiffs had been denied equal protection under the Texas State Constitution
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Upon reviewing the lower court's decision, the Supreme Court
was forced to resolve the question of whether Texas' school
funding system functioned to the disadvantage of some suspect
class, or infringed on a fundamental right, thereby requiring
strict scrutiny. 54 If the system did not disadvantage a suspect
class or infringe upon a fundamental right, then the Court had to
apply a rational basis test. 55 If the Court found, however, that a
suspect class or a fundamental interest was at stake, then the
56
lower court decision would be upheld.
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Rodriguez, found the
reasoning of the district court to be misguided. 57 He held that the
lower court's analysis of suspect classification and fundamental
rights was less than convincing. 58 Rather, the Court felt the
correct undertaking was to resolve whether the Texas funding
system discriminated: "(1) against 'poor' persons whose incomes
fall below some identifiable level of poverty or who might be
characterized as functionally 'indigent,' or (2) against those who
are relatively poorer than others, or (3) against all those who,
irrespective of their personal incomes, happen to reside in
relatively poorer school districts." 59 If the financing system
discriminated against any of the foregoing, only then would the
Court have to determine whether the classification should be
deemed suspect. 60
In order to decide whether the Texas system had a
discriminatory effect, the Court looked at prior case law to
and that the system violated the Education Provision of the Texas State
Constitution. Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. at 285.
54. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
55. Id.
56. Id.

57. Id. The Court noted that the lower court relied on decisions that dealt
with equal treatment of indigents at a criminal trial and during the appellate
process. Id. In addition, the lower court considered cases dealing with the right
to vote in its determination that wealth was a suspect class requiring strict
scrutiny. Id. The Supreme Court held that such decisions were not controlling
with respect to the issue at hand. Id.
58. Id. at 18-40.
59. Id. at 19-20.

60. Id. at 20.
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determine the characteristics of a suspect class. 6 1 Individuals who
constituted the discriminated class shared the following
characteristic: "because of their impecunity they were completely
unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a consequence,
they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful
opportunity to enjoy that benefit." 62 Upon examination,
however, the Court decided that this characteristic was not
present. 63 First, they determined that there was no demonstration
64
that the funding system disadvantaged any class of indigents.
The Court remarked that the poorest families may not even reside
in the poorest districts. 65 Second, the Court held that there was
no "absolute deprivation of [a] desired benefit" 66 because the
children in these poorer areas did receive a public education,
despite the fact that it was not of the same quality as that
provided to students in the wealthier districts. 67 Since the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not demand
equal advantages or absolute equality, the Court accepted this
result.68

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.at 24-25.
64. Id.
65. Id.at25.
66. Id.at 23.
67. Id.at 26.
68. Id. at 23; see also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 137, 149 (1972)
(holding a Texas filing fee unconstitutional on Equal Protection grounds when
used for a candidate to get on the ballot, however, "reasonable candidate filing
fees or licensing fees in other contexts" may be held valid); Mayer v. City of
Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 194 (1971) (holding that state must supply indigent
with a "'record of sufficient completeness'" for appellate review, however,
this does not mean a "complete verbatim transcript" available to those who
may be able to afford it); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1970) (holding
that a state need not "purchase a stenographer's transcript in every case where
a defendant cannot buy it" as there are "other means of affording adequate and
effective appellate review to indigent defendants"); Draper v. Washington, 372
U.S. 487, 495 (1963) (holding that the state need not provide every defendant
with a full stenographic transcript when "[a]lternative methods of reporting
trial proceedings... place before the appellate court an equivalent reporter of
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In Rodriguez, the Court held that this matter was not a proper
one in which to apply strict judicial scrutiny.69 In its reasoning,
the Court noted that "the traditional indicia of suspectness" were
not present. 70 There had been no history of discriminatory
treatment, nor was the class in a position of political
powerlessness. As a result, the Court upheld the constitutionality
71
of the property funding system.
Whether education should be deemed a fundamental right was
another issue which required resolution. 72 The importance of
education was manifested in Brown v. Board of Education,73 and
the Court in Rodriguez emphasized that its decision would not
detract from this importance. 74 However, the Court held that the
mere importance of education does not, by itself, justify it as a
fundamental right requiring strict judicial scrutiny under the
75
Equal Protection Clause.
Instead, the Rodriguez Court stated that the key to determining
whether education is a fundamental right must come from the
the events at trial from which the appellant's contentions arose); Williamson v.
Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (finding State not required to provide
absolute equality as long as there is no "invidious discrimination" or violation
of due process).
69. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The plaintiffs in Brown were black children
representing various school districts from several states. Id. at 486-87. They
argued that segregated public schools were inherently unequal and deprived
them of equal protection of the laws. Id. at 488. The Court found that the
segregation of white and black children in public schools violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, stating that "[tioday,
education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments." Id. at 493.
74. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 30.
75. Id. at 33. The Court refused to weigh the importance of education
against the fundanrental right to travel, stating "[iut is not the province of this
Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing
equal protection of the laws." Id.; see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618 (1969) (holding the right to interstate travel to be fundamental and stating
that any law which impinged on this right must be subject to strict judicial
review).
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Constitution itself.76 A determination must be made as to
whether education is a right that is implicitly or explicitly derived
from the Constitution. 77 The Court found that it was neither. 78
Although recognizing education as indisputably important, since
it is neither implicitly nor explicitly guaranteed by the United
States Constitution, the Court refused to depart from the rational
basis standard of review typically applied to a state's social and
economic legislation. 79 The Court held that, as long as a school
system provides a child with the basic minimal skills necessary
for the enjoyment of free speech, as well as the ability to
participate in the political process, the financing system will be
deemed constitutional. 80 According to the Court, it was not
illegal to bestow differing benefits or burdens on people because
of their wealth; "[i]t has simply never been within the
constitutional prerogative of this Court to nullify statewide
measures for financing public services merely because the
burdens or benefits thereof fall unevenly depending upon the
relative wealth of the political subdivisions in which citizens
live.'"81

In a notable dissent, Justice Marshall criticized the majority
opinion and held that education was a fundamental interest. 82 He
pointed out that the majority chose to simply classify cases into
two categories, mere rationality or strict scrutiny.8.3 However,
Justice Marshall found these arbitrary classifications to be
inconsistent with the Court's previous decisions in the area of
equal protection. 84 In reviewing prior cases involving
discrimination, Justice Marshall noted that the Court had applied
a variation of standards, depending upon the constitutional or
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 33-34.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 36-37.
Id. at 54.

82. Id. at 116 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. Id.at 98 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84. Id.(Marshall, J., dissenting).
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societal importance of the issue. 85 Justice Marshall also took
issue with the majority's contention that fundamental interests are
86
either implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.
According to Justice Marshall, in previous decisions of the
Court, there were rights that were not guaranteed by a
constitutional provision, but nonetheless the Court applied strict
judicial scrutiny. 87 He suggested that the right to procreate, for
example, was neither implicitly nor explicitly guaranteed by the
Constitution. 88 He also noted that other rights previously
declared fundamental included the right to vote and the right to
appeal from a criminal conviction. 89
Justice Marshall proposed his own test for determining whether
an interest is fundamental. 90 He stated that:
Although not all fundamental interests are constitutionally
guaranteed, the determination of which interests are fundamental
should be firmly rooted in the text of the Constitution. The task
in every case should be to determine the extent to which
constitutionally guaranteed rights are dependent on interests not
mentioned in the Constitution. As the nexus between the specific
constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional interest draws
closer, the nonconstitutional interest becomes more fundamental
and the degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the interest is
85. Id. at 98-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 99-100 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 100-02 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. Id. at 100 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942). The Skinner Court invalidated a statute authorizing
sterilization of persons convicted of three or more felonies of "moral
turpitude." Id. at 541. However, this statute did not apply to certain white
collar crimes. Id. at 538-39. As a result, the Court objected to such
discrimination and reasoned that strict scrutiny applied because "[miarriage

and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the
race." Id. at 541.
89. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 100. (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964) (holding that the right to vote is
"of the essence of a democratic society"); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956) (holding that the denial of trial transcripts to indigent defendants which
are necessary to hear an appeal denied them equal protection and due process
of law).
90. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 102 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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For example, with respect to procreation, though the Constitution
itself did not guarantee this right, it is closely related to the right
to privacy, and therefore requires heightened judicial scrutiny. 92
Justice Marshall believed that the only way to ensure the integrity
of a constitutional right was to prevent discrimination of any of
the related interests. 93
C. How The New York Court Of Appeals Applied Rodriguez
When New York State's educational financing system was
placed at issue in Board of Education v. Nyquist,94 the New York
Court of Appeals relied on the Supreme Court's decision in
Rodriguez and found the system constitutional. The court held
that the statutory provisions for allocating state aid to local
districts for education purposes did not violate the Equal
Protection Clauses of either the Federal or State Constitutions. 95
91. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 103 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94. 57 N.Y.2d 27, 41, 439 N.E.2d 359, 364, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 649
(1982).
95. Id. at 46, 439 N.E.2d at 367-68, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 652. In rendering
this decision, the court of appeals reversed the appellate division. Id.; see also
Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 83 A.D.2d 217, 269, 443 N.Y.S.2d 843, 845 (2d
Dep't 1981). Judge Lazer, writing for the second department, held that New
York's method of funding education violated both the Equal Protection Clause
and the Education Article of the New York State Constitution. The court
recognized the existing disparities and noted that for poorer districts to attain
education programs comparable to affluent districts, these poorer districts must
be taxed at relatively high rates. As a result, there are difficulties in getting
budgets approved or, worse yet, it requires imposition of austerity budgets.
The consequence of this is "limited transportation, supplies, library and
textbook purchases ... rises in rates of mortgage foreclosure and community
instability." Id. at 227, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 850. In addressing the equal
protection issue, the second department stated that the question was not
whether there was an absolute deprivation of education, but rather, the issue
was whether the evidence clearly indicates that "less educational opportunity
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Additionally, the court determined that the provisions were

constitutional under the Education Article, 96 which provides in
relevant part that "[t]he legislature shall provide for the
maintenance and support of a system of free common schools
97
wherein all the children of this state may be educated."

In Nyquist, 98 an action for a declaratory judgment was brought
by the Boards of Education of twenty-seven school districts
throughout the state and a dozen students attending those schools.
The plaintiffs' contention was that the educational funding
system 99 was unconstitutional because it resulted in "grossly
disparate financial support and . . . educational opportunities"

within the various districts. 100 In addition, the plaintiffs argued
that the affluent districts were better able to raise revenue

through property taxes, thereby allowing them to provide
educational opportunities not available to poorer districts. 10 1 In

conjunction therewith, representatives of four major cities
intervened, asserting the same violations of federal and state

constitutional provisions. 10 2 The intervenors' position was that,
based on wealth discrimination establishes a violation of the equal protection
provision." Id. at 246, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 861. The court answered
affirmatively. On the Education Article issue, Judge Lazer compared New
York's provision to that of New Jersey and Washington, and found that "the
State must provide its children at least as much as what others must furnish
pursuant to constitutional directives such as 'thorough and efficient' or
'ample.'" Id. at 248, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 863.
96. Id.
97. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § I.
98. 57 N.Y.2d 27, 35, 439 N.E.2d 359, 361, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 645
(1982).
99. During the 1981-82 school year, $9.6 billion was expended for public
elementary and secondary education. Of this $9.6 billion, $5.6 billion was
revenue generated in the form of local taxes; the remaining $4 billion was
supplied through State aid. Id. at 37 n.2, 439 N.E.2d at 363 n.2, 453
N.Y.S.2d at 647 n.2.
100. Id. at 35, 439 N.E.2d at 361, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
101. Id. at 36, 439 N.E.2d at 362, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
102. Id. The intervenors were members of the boards of education,
officials, taxpayers, students of the cities of New York, Buffalo, Rochester,
Syracuse, and Parent-Teacher Association Federations of the City of New
York. Id.
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although cities could easily raise local tax revenue from local

sources, there were special financial burdens which were present

10 3
only within city areas.
New York's highest court recognized the existence of a wide
disparity in financial support through property tax assessment. lo4
However, in addressing the Fourteenth Amendment issue, the
court determined that this case was similar to Rodriguez and
105
therefore found no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
When confronted with the issue of the New York State Equal
Protection Clause, the court utilized the rational basis test and
found no impermissible discrimination toward students who
resided in the poorer districts. 10 6 The court justified the use of
the rational basis test by stating that simply because education
was a high priority, it did not mean thai the same should be
classified as a "fundamental constitutional right triggering a
higher standard of judicial review for purposes of equal
protection analysis." 107 In addition, the court explained that each
community has the power to take control of such educational

opportunities through its voters. In approving school funding
through local taxes, districts are able to minimize existing

103. Id. The intervenors asserted four major areas of special burden which
included: 1) "[m]unicipal overburden," 2) diminished purchasing power of the
municipal education dollar, 3) greater student absenteeism, and 4) larger
concentrations of pupils with special educational needs. Id.
104. Id. at 40, 439 N.E.2d at 364, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 648.
105. Id. at 41, 439 N.E.2d at 365, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 649. The intervenors
argued separately that inequality resulted not from low property wealth, but
from "metropolitan overburden," which served to reduce financial resources.
Id. The court responded to this argument by stating that, although education
and other public services compete for municipal money, the cities get financial
help from additional sources which are not available to non-city districts. Id.
106. Id. at 41, 439 N.E.2d at 365, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 650; see also In re
Levy, 38 N.Y.2d 653, 345 N.E.2d 556, 382 N.Y.S.2d 13 (holding that
rational basis and not strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard of review
when confronted with a challenge involving state action and the right to a free
public education), appealdismissed sub nom., Levy v. City of New York, 429
U.S. 805 (1976).
107. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 43, 439 N.E.2d at 366, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 650.
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disparities by votes from these taxpayers.108 The taxpayers have
the ability to provide for better services and facilities through
their consent. 109 As a result, the court of appeals disposed of the
claim that there was a violation of the State Equal Protection
Clause1 10 and found that a rational relationship to a legitimate
state purpose existed. 111
Finally, the court considered whether the funding system
violated the Education Article of the New York State
Constitution. 112 The court reversed the decision of the appellate
division and held that the current method of financing did not
violate the Education Article of the New York State
3
Constitution. 11
In reaching this decision, the court relied heavily upon the
Framers' intent at the time of the Constitutional Convention of
1894.114 When the education article was adopted, there were
several thousand school districts within the state, each with a
varying degree of wealth and educational opportunity. 1 15 Since
there were such disparities existing at the inception of the
education article and there was no provision enacted to remedy
the problem, the court concluded that the purpose of the article
was to provide only "minimal acceptable facilities' and
services." 116 Moreover, the court found no indication that the
system was supposed to ensure equality throughout the state;
rather, the legislature need only provide a system of free schools
to all children. 117 Since a system of free public schools existed in
New York, there was no violation of the education article.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id. at 45, 439 N.E.2d at 367, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 650.
Id.
Id. at 47, 439 N.E.2d at 368, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
Id. at 44, 439 N.E.2d at 366, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 651. The court held

that "the preservation and promotion of local control of education--is both a
legitimate State interest and one to which the present financing system is
reasonably related." Id.
112. Id.

113. Id. at 49, 439 N.E.2d at 369, 452 N.Y.S.2d at 654.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 47, 439 N.E.2d at 368, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 652.
Id.
Id. at 47, 439 N.E.2d at 368, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653.
Id. at 48, 439 N.E.2d at 368, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss3/6

18

Sarbak: New York's Educational Finance Scheme

1994]

NEW YORK'S EDUCATIONAL
FINANCE SCHEME

793

Equally important in the court's decision was that the majority
was comfortable with the fact that New York's per pupil
expenditures exceeded all but two other states. 118 The court was
also reluctant to invalidate decisions concerning allocations of
public funds by requiring a higher priority in education unless a
"gross and glaring inadequacy" existed in the current funding
system. 11 9 Therefore, because no such inadequacies existed, and
because the legislative mandate requiring free common schools
was being met, the court found the funding system was not in
12 0
violation of the education article.
D. Other States' Perspectives On School Funding Issues
The Rodriguez decision did not completely foreclose litigation
in the school funding area. This decision made clear that any
pressure on individual states to modify their funding systems
could not be done through the federal courts. 12 1 However,
instead of claiming a Fourteenth Amendment violation, the
plaintiffs would have to resort to attacking the constitutionality of
funding systems via the state's equal guarantee or education
provision. 122
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.

121. See Stephen M. Barro, Alternative Post-Serrano Systems and Their
Expenditure Implications, in SCHOOL FINANCE IN TRANSITION, THE COURTS
AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM 25

(1974).
122. See Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 20 of Crawford County, 651
S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983), Serrano v. Priest II, 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert.
denied, Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Robinson v. Cahill, 303
A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973); Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 of King City v. State, 585 P.2d
71 (Wa. 1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (NV. Va. 1979). Other
possibilities for educational funding reform, which are not specifically
addressed by this Comment, include federal and state legislation which would
develop finance systems which are more equalized. For example, the Michigan

Legislature recently approved an amendment to replace property taxes as a
method of funding public schools. See Michigan Voters Adopt Plan on Sales
and Cigarette Taxes, N.Y. TiES, March 16, 1994, at A18. Specifically, the
voters agreed that revenue raised through the state sales and cigarette taxes
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For example, subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in
Rodriguez, the California Supreme Court had to grapple with the
school funding issue a second time in Serrano v. Priest11. 123 In
Serrano II, the court upheld its original decision that the funding
system was unconstitutional. 124 This decision, however, was
based not on a Fourteenth Amendment analysis, but rather, on
state equal protection grounds, since Rodriguez effectively
eliminated the Fourteenth Amendment as a basis for seeking
125
school finance reform.
The Serrano II court found that substantial disparities existed
among the various schools with respect to the amount of per
student expenditures. 126 This result was directly linked to the
wide range in property tax assessments. 127 Such disparities
perpetuated the inequality of educational opportunities and
differences in pupil achievement. 128 Therefore, despite the
Rodriguez decision, the California court refused to depart from
its previous determination. 129 The court concluded that
discrimination in educational opportunities on the basis of a
district's wealth involved a suspect classification, thereby
triggering strict scrutiny. 130 In addition, education was found to
be a fundamental right under the California State Equal
Protection Clause. 13 1 Since the Serrano II decision, other states

would provide new sources of school funding. State sales tax would be raised

from 4% to 6% and tax on a pack of cigarettes would be increased from 25
cents to 75 cents. Id. Had this proposal been defeated, a backup plan of
increasing state income tax would have automatically taken effect. Id.
123. 557 P.2d 929 (Cal. 1976), cert. denied, Clowes v. Serrano, 432 U.S.
907 (1977).
124. Id. at 958.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 939.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 951.
130. Id.
131. Id.
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have followed suit by declaring property tax funding violative of
132
their respective equal guarantee provisions.
Subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Rodriguez, the
New Jersey Supreme Court declared its educational finance
system unconstitutional in Robinson v. Cahill.13 3 The court
circumvented the result reached in Rodriguez by concluding that
funding disparities were violative not of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather, of the state's
education provision.134 This provision requires that the free
public school system be "thorough and efficient."135 The court
noted that the legislature is entrusted with the duty to ensure that
every child receives the necessary educational opportunities for
effective citizenship. 13 6 The court recognized that a correlation
existed between the sums expended and the quality of educational
opportunities received. 137 Although it held New Jersey's funding
system unconstitutional, the court rejected the concept of a
"fundamental right" and the application of the Equal Protection
Clause.138 Rather, the court held that state constitutional
provisions, as well as common and statutory law, required the
invalidation of the school funding scheme. 139

132. See, e.g., Dupree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30 of Crawford County,
651 S.W.2d 90 (Ark. 1983); Washakie County Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Herschler,
606 P.2d 310, 319 (Vyo. 1980); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859 (%V. Va
1979).
133. 303 A.2d 273, 298 (N.J. 1973).
134. Id. at 295-96. The trial court found that educational funds were
derived from three sources: local property taxes comprised 67%; state aid,
28 %; and federal aid, 5 %. Id. at 276.
135. Id.; see also N.J. CONST. art. VIII, §4, cl. 1. This provision provides
that "[t]he legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a
thorough and efficient system of free public schools.. .

136.
137.
138.
139.

."

Id.

Robinson, 303 A.2d at 294-95.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 285-86.
Id.
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II. CRITICAL CHANGE
A. Recent Decisions Suggest A New Trend In The Educational
Finance Reform Movement

Following the decision set forth in Robinson v. Cahill, 140 other
plaintiffs have recently succeeded in challenging the
constitutionality of their state's school funding systems through
the use of their respective state's education articles. 14 1 For
example, state supreme courts in Texas, 142 Kentucky, 14 3 New
Jersey 144 and Montana 145 each declared their funding systems
violative of the education provision of their respective state
constitutions. A similar challenge was recently made in
Wisconsin, but was unsuccessful. 146
140. 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).
141. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.
1989); Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Montana, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont.
1989); Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.D.2d 359 (N.J. 1990); Edgewood Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989); Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d
568 (Wis. 1989).
142. Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
The court held that the state's school financing system was "neither financially
efficient nor efficient in the sense of providing for a 'general diffusion of
knowledge' statewide." Id. at 397. It noted that 42% of the revenue came from
districts where the value of the property in the richest areas was 700 times
more than the value in the poorer areas. Id. at 391. In addition, spending per
student varied in the district from $2112 to $19,333. Id.
143. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989)
(holding that a school funding system must be adequately funded in order to
achieve the substantial uniformity needed to ensure that every child is provided
with the equal opportunity to have an adequate education).
144. Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990). See also infra notes 174188.
145. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont.
1989) (declaring funding system violative of the constitutional guarantee
affording equal educational opportunity given the vast disparities in wealth
among the districts).
146. See Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 1989). During the 198586 school year, revenue was derived from the following sources: federal share,
4.68%; state share, 36.07%; local share, 59.25%. Id. at 570 n.l. The
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In 1989, the Texas funding system was again brought before
the court in Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby. 147
The Texas Supreme Court found the state's property tax based
school funding system to be unconstitutional under the Texas
education article and directed the legislature to establish an
"efficient" system in accordance with the provision. 148 The court
noted that "glaring disparities" existed among districts in their
ability to raise revenue; a disparity of 700 to 1 existed between
the richest and poorest districts. 149 Such a system was found to

be not only financially inefficient, but it also prevented propertypoor district children from receiving an efficient education. 150
Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the current funding system did not violate
the uniformity requirement of the state constitution merely because a district
has a higher concentration of disadvantaged students. Id. at 574-78.
Furthermore, the court reasoned that disparities in expenditures resulting from
the operation of a statutory system of state aid that does not interfere with a
child's right to attend public schools, to obtain a basic education, or result in
discriminatory disbursement of funds, does not violate the state equal
protection provision. Id. at 579. Although the court noted that education is a
fundamental right, it qualified that equal educational opportunity did not
require "absolute equality" in per-pupil expenditures. Id. The court concluded
that "equal opportunity for education [which] mandates an entirely different
scheme of financing requiring the state to distribute resources unequally among
students to respond to the particularized needs of each student is inconsistent
with the intent evidenced in the express language of art. X."; see also Wis.
CONST. art. X, § 3. This section states: "The legislature shall provide by law
for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as
practicable; and such schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all
children between the ages of 4 and 20 years." Id.
147. 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). During the 1985-86 school year, local
school districts generated approximately 55% of education revenue from local
ad valorem property taxes. Id. at 392. The state contributed 42%, which was
raised by sales taxes and various severance and excise taxes. Id. The remaining
3% came from federal aid and other sources. Id.
148. Id. at 398. The Texas Constitution states that "it shall be the duty of
the Legislature of the State to establish and make suitable provision for the
support and maintenance of an efficient system of public free schools." TEX.
CONST. art. VII, § 1.
149. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d at 393.
150. Id.
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In interpreting the education provision of the state constitution,
the court examined the intent of the framers and concluded that
there was a duty to provide an "efficient" system of public
schools. 15 1 Furthermore, the court concluded that at the drafting
of the constitution, the framers could not have anticipated the
disparities in property wealth which resulted in unequal
distribution of funding because such inequalities did not exist at
that time. 152 As a result, the Texas court determined that the
extreme differences between the districts existed because the
wealthier districts offered far more in the way of educational
opportunity than property-poor districts. 153
Furthermore, the Kentucky Supreme Court was asked to decide
whether its current school system was constitutional in the case
of Rose v. Council for Better Education.154 In making its
decision, the court had to determine whether the system was
"efficient," or substantially uniform and equal in providing
educational resources and opportunities for its students. 155 The
court answered this question in the negative, holding the
Kentucky system unconstitutional and finding that the General
Assembly failed to provide adequate legislation which would
ensure an "efficient" system. 15 6 Furthermore, the court found
education to be a fundamental right which should be available to
all students within the state. 157
The court stated that in order for the system to be "efficient,"
there must be adequate funding available. 158 The court concluded
that children in both poor and affluent districts must have equal

151. Id. at 395.
152. Id. at 393.

153. Id. at 391-92. Wealthier districts provide broader curricula, better
facilities and faculty ratios. In addition, they have experienced educators and
counselors, whereas poorer districts lack courses such as physics and
chemistry, and offer no extra-curricular activities. Id.
154. 790 S.W.2d 186, 209 (Ky. 1989).
155. Id. at 191-92.
156. Id. at 215. The Kentucky Constitution mandates an "efficient system
of common schools throughout the state." KY. CONST. § 183.
157. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215.
158. Id. at 211.
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access to educational opportunities.

15 9

According to the court,

this duty did not belong to local counties and districts, rather the

obligation

to provide

a system

which guarantees

such

Assembly.1 60

The
opportunities statewide rests with the General
court then listed a number of factors that must be available to
every child to ensure an efficient educational system. 16 1 It stated
that the Assembly could authorize local school entities to enact a

uniform tax rate for owners of real and personal property to
remedy the vast disparities in taxing that were in effect. 162

Another recent decision addressing the school funding issue
was rendered by the Montana Supreme Court. 163 The plaintiffs,
in an action

for a declaratory

judgment,

challenged

the

constitutionality of the school funding system under the state's
equal protection clause 16 4 and the education provision of the
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 212. The court found that every child must have the following
capabilities:
1) sufficient oral and written communication skills to enable students
to function in a complex and rapidly changing civilization;
2) sufficient knowledge of economic, social and political systems to
enable the student to make informed choices;
3) sufficient understanding of governmental processes to enable the
student to understand the issues that affect his or her community,
state, and nation;
4) sufficient self-knowledge and knowledge of his or her mental and
physical wellness;
5) sufficient grounding in the arts to enable each student to appreciate
his or her cultural and historical heritage;
6) sufficient training or preparation for advanced training in either
academic or vocational fields so as to enable each child to choose
and pursue life work intelligently; and
7) sufficient levels of academic or vocational skills to enable public
school students to compete favorably with their counterparts in
surrounding states, in academics or in the job market.
Id.
162. Id.
163. Helena Elementary Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Montana, 769 P.2d 684 (Mont.
1989).
164. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 4. This section provides that:
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Montana State Constitution. 165 In Helena Elementary School
District v. Montana, the court concluded that the present funding
system was unconstitutional under the state's education article,
and thus did not find it necessary to reach the equal protection
claim.

16 6

At trial, comparison studies were introduced into evidence
which examined the differences between affluent and poor school
districts. 167 The results indicated that disparities in spending
perpetuated "unequal educational opportunities." 168 For
example, wealthier schools maintained far better instructional
materials and textbooks, as well as superior facilities and
curricula.

16 9

When the court examined the plain meaning of the education
provision, it determined that the framers had a "goal" to develop
the full potential of every person within the state through the

The dignity of the human being is inviolable. No person shall be denied
the equal protection of the laws. Neither the state nor any person, firm,
corporation, or institution shall discriminate against any person in the
exercise of his civil or political rights on account of race, color, sex,
culture, social origin or condition, or political or religious ideas.
Id.
165. MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1. This section provides in pertinent part:
(1) It is the goal of the people to establish a system of education which
will develop the full educational potential of each person. Equality
of educational opportunity is guaranteed to each person of the
state....
(3) The legislature shall provide a basic system of free quality public
elementary and secondary schools. The legislature may provide
such other educational institutions, public libraries, and educational
programs as it deems desirable. It shall fund and distribute in an
equitable manner to the school districts the state's share of the cost
of the basic elementary and secondary school system.
Id.
166. Helena, 769 P.2d at 690-91.
167. Id. at 686-87.
168. Id. at 687.
169. Id. at 687-88. One study indicated that wealthier districts offered
greater programs in areas such as industrial arts, home economics, physical
education, arts, music, and gifted programs. Most of the poorer districts did
not even offer programs for gifted or talented students. Id.
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education system. 170 Furthermore, the provision guaranteed an
equal educational opportunity to each and every person. 17 1
Therefore, since the evidence indicated vast disparities among the
districts, which clearly contravened the mandated equality of the
education provision, the court had little trouble declaring the
172
funding system unconstitutional.
The foregoing decisions provided new possibilities to a
movement that sought to relieve inequalities resulting from
disparities in school funding systems. 173 Most recently, the New
Jersey Supreme Court, in Abbott v. Burke, 174 was once again
confronted with the issue of whether its funding system was
constitutional. The court, following the current trend, determined
that the Public School Education Act, 175 enacted in 1975, was
unconstitutional since it violated the "thorough and efficient
170. Id. at 689.
171. Id.

172. Id. at 690.
173. See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989)
(holding school system violated state constitution because it lacked uniformity
throughout the state); Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973) (holding
school funding system unconstitutional because it relied heavily on local taxes
which lead to a large disparity in dollar input per pupil); Helena, 769 P.2d 684
(holding school finance system unconstitutional because disparities between
wealthy and poor school districts created inequities in educational opportunity);
Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989) (holding
school funding system unconstitutional because it discriminated against poorer
districts). But see Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568 (Vis. 1989) (holding
disparities in aid to different school districts was not a violation of state
constitution if the disparities were based on a rational goal of local control over
education).

174. 575 A.2d 359 (N.J. 1990).
175. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7A-1-18A:7A-52 (West 1989). The Act
allows school districts to generate revenue as if their tax base was:
134% of the average school district tax base. The school district sets the
tax rate as if the real property of the district equaled this guaranteed tax
base (GTB). The local revenues generated by the tax from the district's
actual tax base are then supplemented by state aid, called 'equalization
aid,' in an amount that, when added to these local revenues, equals what
that tax rate would have produced if applied to the (GTB).
Abbott, 575 A.2d at 377-78.
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clause" 176 of the state constitution. 177 In so holding, the court
refused to declare the entire system as violative of the provision;
rather, it was unconstitutional only in its application to poorer
school districts. 178 The court stated that educational funding of
179
these districts must be comparable to that of affluent districts.
However, the court stated that funding alone was not a complete
solution to the problem, noting that "[w]ithout educational
reform, the money may accomplish nothing." 180
The Abbott court noted that students in poorer areas face
certain disadvantages and require special educational support to
enable them to fully participate in society and the workplace in
the future. 18 1 For example, children in these disadvantaged areas
require adequate books and guidance programs. 182 In addition,
they need special counseling services to deal with problems
related to teen pregnancy, drugs, crime and family problems
which are notably prevalent in the poorer areas. 183 Furthermore,
the court noted that programs must be made available to students
who might otherwise drop out of school. 184 In order to help
establish these types of programs, the court stated that adequate
funding must be made available. 185
The New Jersey court concluded that differences in property
values were responsible for the disparities in educational
expenditures. 186 The court stated that in order to ensure a
"thorough and efficient system of education [which would]
enable all students to function as citizens and workers in the same
176. N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4. This section provides "[t]he legislature

shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient
system of free public schools for the instruction of all the children in'the State
between the ages of five and eighteen years." Id.
177. Abbott, 575 A.2d at 363.

178. Id.
179. Id.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 402.

Id.
Id.

185. Id. at 402-03.
186. Id. at 377.
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society," the state had to guarantee equal educational
expenditures to the poorer districts. 187 The court rendered this

decision despite the fact that New Jersey maintained one of the
18 8
highest per capita expenditures for education in the nation.

B. The Likelihood Of Successfully Challenging New York's
EducationalFinance System

The constitutionality of New York's educational funding
system was recently disputed in Reform Educational Finance
Inequities Today v. Cuomo (R.E.F.LT.). 189 In its evaluation, the
trial court was unwilling to depart from the earlier decision set
forth in Nyquist, 190 and held that the school funding system did
not violate the Education Article of the New York State
Constitution, 19 1 or the Equal Protection Clauses of either the
State or Federal Constitutions. 192 It stated that "[a]ny deviation
from the [Nyquist] holding must come from either the [New
York] Court of Appeals itself, or by legislative action." 193 In

rendering this decision, however, the court seemed almost
regretful. It noted that Nyquist left open the possibility for future

187. Id. at 403.
188. Id. at 412.
189. 152 Misc. 2d 714, 578 N.Y.S.2d 969 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1991), aft'd, _

A.D.2d

_,

_,

606 N.Y.S.2d 44, 46 (2d Dep't 1993).

The plaintiffs in this case were a non-profit organization suing on behalf of
itself, school districts, taxpayers, boards of education and parents and students
of various districts. Id. at 715, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 969. In the complaint, the
plaintiffs asserted causes of action based on the Education Article of the state
constitution, as well as the Equal Protection Clauses of the Federal and State
Constitutions. Id.
190. Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 439 N.E.2d 359, 453
N.Y.S.2d 643 (1982). See also supra notes 94-120 and accompanying text.
191. N.Y. CONST. art. XI, § I. This provision states that "[t]he legislature
shall provide for the maintenance and support of a system of free common
schools, wherein all the children of this state may be educated." Id.
192. R.E.F.LT, 152 Misc. 2d at 726, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
193. Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 1994

29

Touro Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 3 [1994], Art. 6

804

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 10

litigation when there was a "'gross and glaring inadequacy."' 194
The only problem with this statement was that it was unclear
whether the inadequacies referred to educational funding, or the
quality of the education itself. 195
At the time Nyquist was decided, monetary disparities between
the richest and poorest districts throughout the state were 46 to 1,
respectively. 196 In Suffolk County, these disparities were a mere
17 to 1.197 Almost a decade later, however, monetary disparities
in Suffolk reached as high as 330 to 1.198 The court found that
these differences were not merely statistical; they have real life
effects: deteriorating classrooms, large class sizes, and limited
methods to provide remedial services.199 In addition, the court
expressly recognized that there are ever increasing costly
mandates imposed by the state. 200 In 1982, when Nyquist was
decided, these mandates were not an issue; today, such mandates
have an unequal and unfair impact on the poorer districts. 20 1
Notwithstanding these disparities, the court was unable to depart
from Nyquist because students were receiving a "minimum
standard of education." ' 202 Thus, the court found the funding
system constitutional under New York's education article and the
Equal Protection Clauses of the State and Federal
Constitutions. 203
194. Id. at 717, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 971 (quoting Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d at 48,
439 N.E.2d at 369, 453 N.Y.S.2d at 653 (1982)).

195. Id. at 718, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 718, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 972.
Id. at 719, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 972.

200. Id. The State has imposed mandates without providing additional
funding. Id. at 720, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 973. An example of such a mandate is
asbestos removal. Id. As a result, schools are forced to finance these mandates
by eliminating certain educational programs or by cutting down on its teaching
personnel. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. The court noted that no "minimum standard" was submitted for

consideration, and further, was not even sure if a "minimum standard"
existed. Id.
203. Id. at 726, 578 N.Y.S.2d at 976.
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Appeal was made to the court of appeals and transferred to the
appellate division, second department. 204 The appellate division
did not agree with the plaintiffs' contention that the educational
finance system had changed since Nyquist, resulting in a "gross
and glaring inadequacy." 205 The court determined that the
plaintiffs asserted only that there were disparities between rich
and poor school districts. 206 Such disparities have already been
ruled constitutional by the New York Court of Appeals. 207 Since
there was no allegation that students were not receiving a "sound
and basic education," the court affirmed the lower court's
decision. 2 08
CONCLUSION

Prior to 1989, there seemed to be little hope for efforts
designed to reform school funding systems that were based
primarily on tax assessments. With the recent trend in decisions,
however, there remains hope that equality can be restored to
education. As it stands now, in light of the Supreme Court's
decision in Rodriguez, decisions regarding the constitutionality of
school funding systems are to be decided state by state. It is time
for the New York Court of Appeals to take another look at the
system currently in effect in New York, and reconsider its
constitutionality.
Since the Nyquist decision in 1982, there have been significant
changes. It is evident that the "boom" of the eighties is gone
forever. Instead, the nineties must be faced with a new outlook,
particularly towards education. A recession looms over the nation
and severe budget cuts seriously threaten the quality of education
in New York. The effects of these cuts are clearly different
204. Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today v. Cuomo, 80 N.Y.2d 801, 599
N.E.2d 689, 587 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1992).
205. Reform Educ. Fin. Inequities Today v. Cuomo,

_

A.D.2d

....

606 N.Y.S.2d 44, 46 (2d Dep't 1993).
206. Id.
207. Id. See also supra notes 94-120 and accompanying text.
208. Id.
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throughout the state, and therefore, special concerns should be
given towards reformation of the current funding system.
As a start, New York should look to its neighbor state of New
Jersey for guidance. If New Jersey can declare its finance system
unconstitutional despite having one of the highest per capita
expenditures for education in the nation, then New York may
also do so. New York needs to provide a similar guarantee that
equal funding will be available to all school districts to help ease
the existing disparities. In addition, a reformation of educational
programs must be implemented to deal with the unique problems
that arise in disadvantaged districts. Too many budget cuts are
forcing the elimination of certain educational programs at a time
when these programs should be expanding. The leaders of this
state have to realize that education is the key to our future.
Learning is what develops great minds. It is essential that
children receive the finest education possible so that this country
will remain an intellectual world leader. To secure this status,
equal educational opportunity must be provided for by each
individual state. Moreover, if New York wants to remain a
forerunner in education within the United States, then the
opportunity to receive an equal education must become a priority,
regardless of where a person resides.
"It is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to
succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. "209
JanineM. Sarbak

209. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
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